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IS FAIR USE ACTUALLY FAIR? ANALYZING FAIR USE AND THE
POTENTIAL FOR COMPULSORY LICENSING IN
AUTHORS GUILD V. GOOGLE
Varsha Mangal*
As books are becoming electronic, people are now conducting
more research online instead of venturing into bookstores and
libraries. The number of bookstores in the nation is declining as
people replace the relationship they once had with these stores with
online sources. Particularly, in services such as Google Books,
people use search engines to browse books in the same manner they
would as if they were in a store. The lawsuit between Authors Guild
and Google has been ongoing for over a decade, and the case
largely turns on the question of fair use. However, fair use in certain
situations fails by putting an undue burden on authors to help
benefit the general public. Therefore, there needs to be an alternate
legal avenue in place to address this problem. This Recent
Development argues that, in light of preserving the access of
information to the public, the law should be amended to allow for
compulsory licensing so that information may be widely dispersed
while being sensitive to the significant contributions of Google and
the Authors Guild.
I. INTRODUCTION
The decline of bookstores is frightening yet simultaneously
liberating. It is fearsome because bookstores have been a longestablished means for consumers to browse and buy books.
Countless individuals walk into bookstores, pick up a book, read
excerpts of the text in varying proportion, and then perhaps decide
to buy it. People often even sit down and read large portions of the
*
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would like to thank the NC JOLT staff and editors for their assistance with this
Recent Development, particularly Collette Corser, Chelsea Weiermiller, Cameron
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text and ultimately decide against a purchase. This practice has been
occurring perhaps for as long as bookstores have existed, and it has
no apparent legal consequences. In fact, instead of dissuading
consumers from reading snippets of books in a bookstore, Barnes &
Noble employees find certain consumers, particularly youths seen
reading in the children’s section, to be “[c]ute.”1
It is liberating, however, because the decline of bookstores
resulted in the increase of electronic purchases of books and ebooks. 2 Access to books and information is greater and easier to
obtain than ever before. While these two experiences may feel
analogous to the consumer, these two processes affect authors
differently, which poses a legal conundrum.
For brick-and-mortar bookstores, there is no copyright violation
if consumers read excerpts of a book for free that they do not intend
to buy because the consumers are not encroaching on any of the
rightsholder’s exclusive rights. Furthermore, the system works
because the browsing consumer usually ultimately purchases a book
and thus authors still receive compensation for their work. Although
the process may be different for authors with varying degrees of
fame 3 or depend on whether a business is a chain or a local
bookstore, practically all bookstores aim to function in a manner that
will generate revenue. In some instances, a bookstore will buy books

1
See Sara Jonsson, 8 Types of People You’ll See at the Bookstore, BARNES &
NOBLE (Oct. 9, 2013, 10:15 AM), http://www.barnesandnoble.com/blog/8-typesof-people-youll-see-at-the-bookstore/.
2
See Max Nisen, These Charts Show Just How Bad Things Are For Bookstores,
BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 15, 2013, 10:53 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/why-bookstores-are-doomed-2013-10.
This
article provides graphs that show starting in 2008, there has been a decline in
monthly retail sales at brick and mortar bookstores. Id. The graph shows that
starting in 2008, there was a great increase in e-reader related searches on Google,
specifically for the Kindle. Id. This spike in interest for e-readers corresponded
precisely with the decline of sales in brick and mortar bookstores. Id.
3
As discussed in this Introduction, consignment situations are more likely to
occur for local authors who are not very famous. However, bookstores may
purchase the book in full from famous authors who write books that are in greater
demand and more likely to sell.
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outright.4 However, sometimes a purchase of the book is relatively
risky, such as when local authors want to sell books to a small, local
bookstore. In response, bookstores created an alternate system:
consignment. In this process, the bookstore will pay the author once
the book is sold, and the author generates only a certain percentage
of the retail price of the book, the standard being 60%.5
Consignments deal with high-risk scenarios, and authors only
receive revenue when a consumer purchases a book.6 However, as
technology has brought forth significant changes, the way the world
browses and purchases books has also drastically changed. This
Recent Development specifically examines the unique legal
problems for book authors and copyright owners resulting from the
rise of e-books and books purchased electronically. Although this
paper will discuss the technology developed by Google in depth,
Amazon and Barnes & Noble have also digitized books to be read
instantaneously on a tablet, laptop, or cell phone.7
Specifically, in Part II, this Recent Development examines
Authors Guild v. Google8, a Second Circuit decision indicating the
problems inherent in electronic books. Part III discusses the fair use
analysis, the current circuit split, and argues that although Authors
Guild was decided correctly, fair use adopts a winner-take-all
system that does more harm to the plaintiffs than is just. Part IV
explores compulsory licensing, a different legal avenue that has
been used in copyright law, and its treatment both internationally
and in America. Part V argues that compulsory licensing should be
adopted to remedy the problems of fair use in Authors Guild v.
4

Stephanie Chandler, How Authors Can Sell to Bookstores, Plus Free
Consignment Agreement, AUTHORITY PUBLISHING (Dec. 12, 2012),
http://authoritypublishing.com/book-marketing/how-authors-can-sell-to-booksto
res-free-bookstore-consignment-agreement-for-authors/.
5
Id.
6
See id.
7
Amazon sells the Kindle, which allows people to read books electronically on
a small tablet See Kindle Books, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/KindleeBooks/b?ie=UTF8&node=154606011 (last visited Mar. 4, 2016); Barnes &
Noble sells a similar device called the NOOK. See NOOK Books, BARNES &
NOBLE, http://www.barnesandnoble.com/b/nook-books/_/N-8qa (last visited
Mar. 4, 2016).
8
804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied __ U.S. __ (2016)(No. 15-849).
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Google. This solution strives to mold copyright law to adapt to
current technology, specifically in proposing a solution that models
the online copies and purchases of books to be analogous to an
author selling a book at a bookstore as discussed above. For this is
what is precisely occurring: people are not going to bookstores and
libraries as often when searching for books, but instead people are
using now-available online services. 9 Thus, the concept and the
transaction are the same. Logically, the law that governs the two
methods should account for this trend and attempt to provide the
same benefits to retailers, authors, and consumers alike.
II. AUTHORS GUILD V. GOOGLE—THE PROBLEMATIC FACTS
CONCERNING THE BATTLE OF COPYRIGHT HOLDERS’ RIGHTS
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
In order to understand the legal issues concerning Authors Guild
v. Google, it is important to understand the underlying facts. This
section will discuss the background that led to the dispute and then
discuss the current status and major arguments in the suit.
A. Technicalities of the Google Library Project
This Recent Development attempts to resolve issues from the
long-litigated case, Authors Guild v. Google.10 The dispute revolved
around Google’s Library Project, in which Google created digitized
copies of millions of books. 11 The project allowed the public to
generate key word searches to extract specific information, without
acquiring the authors’ permission or providing the authors with any
royalties for their copyrighted works.12
9

See Nisen, supra note 2.
Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 211–12. Authors Guild sued Google on
September 20, 2005, as a putative class action. This was then followed by several
years of negotiations that were ultimately rejected by the district court in March
22, 2011, “as unfair to the class members who relied on the named plaintiffs to
represent their interests.” Id. In October 2011, Authors Guild filed a fourth
amended class action complaint. Id. On November 14, 2013, the district court
granted Google’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of fair use. On
December 10, 2013, Authors Guild appealed. Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
10
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Google’s Library Project involved agreements in 2004 with the
world’s major libraries. These libraries submitted books from their
collections to Google, which then digitally scanned and converted
the works to machine-readable text and subsequently created
indexes for the collection of these texts. 13 Additionally, Google
allowed these participating libraries to obtain digital copies of the
books they submitted, but specified that the libraries shall not use
the digital copies to violate copyright laws. 14 So far, Google has
scanned, converted, and indexed over 20 million books of all kinds,
including fiction, non-fiction, and even rare books that are out of
print.15
As a direct result of the conversion and indexing, Google is able
to provide a “snippet-search” function that allows anyone in the
public to read “snippets” of text that they wish to search for free.16
An illustration of the snippet-feature provided in the appendix of the
case depicts the result found when a scholar searches the term “fair
use” in Google:17

Figure 1:

13

Id. at 208.
Id. at 207.
15
Id. at 208. The books in the collection consist of works that that are in the
public domain as well as copyrighted works. In order to ensure and improve
accuracy of it digitized books, Google keeps the original scanned image of each
book. Id.
16
Id. at 207.
17
Id. at 230 (Appendix A).
14
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As shown above, a limited portion of the text is available and
the exact terms the scholar searched for is highlighted in yellow. The
benefit is tremendous—this technology allows people to access
information instantaneously that would “otherwise not be obtainable
in lifetimes of searching.”18 It is also noteworthy that Google does
not make any direct profit from this through advertising or a
subsequent purchase by a consumer.19 However, the Library Project

18

Id. at 209.
Id. (“No advertising is displayed to a user of the search function. Nor does
Google receive payment by reason of the searcher’s use of Google’s link to
purchase the book.”).
19
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can nevertheless be viewed as inherently commercial 20 because it
prevents competitor search engines from achieving similar results
and thus puts Google at a much greater market advantage. 21 This
market advantage exists because (1) Google can generate better
search results than its competitors and (2) competitors have been
deterred for over a decade from digitizing books for fear of
copyright liability from the uncertain results of Authors Guild v.
Google. 22 Consequently, Google has developed this project for
several years while no competitor has undertaken a similar
endeavor. The Google Library Project provides undeniable benefits,
but at a cost to rightsholders. As a result, rightsholders brought suit
against Google in Authors Guild v. Google.
B. Authors Guild v. Google
On October 16, 2015, the Second Circuit affirmed the U.S.
District Court of the Southern District of New York’s decision that
Google’s project involving digitally copying books did not
constitute copyright infringement. 23 The Authors Guild appealed
this decision on December 31, 2015, but on April 18, 2016, the
Supreme Court denied certiorari.24
While Google successfully argued that it should be entitled to
continue its Library Project under the fair use exception in copyright
law, several authors still believe Google’s actions constitute
copyright infringement. Specifically, Jim Bouton, 25 Betty Miles, 26
and Joseph Goulden, 27 who each own copyrights on works that
20

Commercialism is a consideration in the first factor of the fair use analysis.
See infra Part III.
21
Brief for Appellants at 6, Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d
Cir. 2015) (No. 12-4829).
22
Benjamin J. Keele, Copyright and Research in Google Book Search, WM &
MARY
LAW
SCHOOL
SCHOLARSHIP
REPOSITORY
(2011),
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1026&context=libpubs.
23
Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
24
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 208 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied
__ U.S. __ (2016) (No. 15-849).
25
JIM BOUTON, BALL FOUR (1970).
26
BETTY MILES, THE TROUBLE WITH THIRTEEN (1979).
27
JOSEPH GOULDEN, THE SUPERLAWYERS: THE SMALL AND POWERFUL
WORLD OF THE GREAT WASHINGTON LAW FIRMS (1972).
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Google included in the Library Project, and joined Authors Guild in
a suit against Google for copyright infringement on behalf of
themselves and authors who are similarly situated.28
The reason the plaintiffs sued is simple—authors are concerned
regarding the loss of present and future revenue, which in turn can
harm the nation’s creative culture. Google commenced its project
without the permission from the copyright holders for the works
being utilized in the project. 29 The Authors Guild expressed two
major ways Google’s Library project causes the authors economic
harm: (1) it creates a disincentive for researchers to go out and buy
books if they can find the material they need on Google Books, and
(2) the slippery slope argument which suggests that if Google’s use
is considered fair use, then anyone can claim fair use in digitizing
books, which will inevitably lead to “widespread, free, and
unrestricted availability of books online.”30 Thus, the Authors Guild
claimed that Google poses a “serious threat to writers and their
livelihoods, one which will affect the depth, resilience, and vitality
of our intellectual culture.” 31 However, the Authors Guild
emphasized that it believes that Google Books is “a good
thing . . . .”32 These authors simply want a system where authors can
still be compensated.33
The holding of Authors Guild v. Google rested on the fair use
defense. Although Google clearly used copyrighted works to
provide its snippet-search function, Google’s use of the copyrighted
material is fair use, and thus, Google does not have to pay the
Authors Guild a dime. Had Google’s use been considered to not be
fair use, then Google would have been held liable for infringing over
20 million books and paid the respective damages, and the project
would have continued without consent and licenses for each
copyrighted book. Thus, had Google lost, not only does the
company incur serious economic harm, but also the public would no
28

See Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 208.
Id.
30
Where We Stand, THE AUTHORS GUILD, https://www.authorsguild.org/
where-we-stand/authors-guild-v-google/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2016).
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
29
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longer have the wonderful resource that the snippet function
provides.
In this case, Google in essence asked for forgiveness through fair
use, since it had failed to appropriately ask for permission at the
outset. In light of the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari, it is now
final that forgiveness has been granted. However, the Supreme
Court in its denial missed an opportunity to hear the case and resolve
the inconsistency of the application of the fair use seen lower courts.
Thus, this Recent Development will analyze the fair use defense in
the next section in light of the varying analyzes seen in different
circuits, and help readers understand the underlying consequences
of granting Google fair use.
III. THE MOST TROUBLESOME DOCTRINE IN COPYRIGHT LAW:
FAIR USE
The decisions in Authors Guild v. Google ultimately turned on
whether Google’s actions qualified as a specific defense, fair use, to
the author’s copyright protections. In 1984, the Supreme Court
decided Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 34 and
acknowledged that “[t]he doctrine of fair use has been called, with
some justification, ‘the most troublesome in the whole law of
copyright.’”35 The passage of time has not made fair use any less
troublesome. The root of this trouble is that Congress did not
“provide definitive rules when it codified the fair use doctrine in the
1976 [Copyright] Act; it simply incorporated a list of factors ‘to be
considered’”36 As a result, different circuits have begun to analyze
the factors slightly differently. Part A will discuss the fair use four
factor test and circuit split, and Part B will apply the rules to Authors
Guild while taking a careful look at the analysis provided by the
Second Circuit’s Court of Appeal decision. This analysis ultimately
determines that although the Second Circuit correctly found for fair
34

464 U.S. 417 (1984).
35
Id. at 475 (quoting Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d
Cir. 1939); see also Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers,
Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1174 (5th Cir. 1980); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061,
1068 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978).
36
Sony, 464 U.S. at 476.
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use, the doctrine of fair use fails in this situation because it unjustly
place a significant burden on one party to provide a public benefit.
A. The Circuit Split
The four fair use factors, as set forth by the statute, are:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.37

At its core, the fair use defense is exactly how it sounds—it is
grounded in the notion of fairness. Fair use is “troublesome”
because courts do not sum the factors to determine whether
something is fair use.38 Rather, courts perform a nuanced analysis
balancing the benefit to the public with the harm to the creators.39
When benefit to the public outweighs the harm the creators would
face, courts find fair use. 40 However, the statute does not tell us
which factor is more important in the analysis and whether there
should be placed more emphasis on the public interest or the
creators.41 As a result, courts have valued the four factors of the test

37

17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577–78 (1994). The
court held:
The task is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like
the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis. The text
employs the terms ‘including’ and ‘such as’ in the preamble paragraph
to indicate the ‘illustrative and not limitative’ function of the examples
given which thus provide only general guidance about the sorts of
copying that courts and Congress most commonly had found to be fair
uses. Nor may the four statutory factors be treated in isolation, one from
another. All are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light
of the purposes of copyright.
Id. (citations omitted).
39
See id.
40
See id.
41
See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
38
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differently, and there is a clear split between the Second and Seventh
Circuits in the weighing of these factors.42
The Second Circuit considers the first factor most important,43
but the Seventh Circuit places greater emphasis on the fourth
factor. 44 Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC 45 and Cariou v. Prince, 46
cases involving appropriation art, clearly demonstrates the split.47 In
Kienitz, the Seventh Circuit case involved Micheal Kienitz, a
photographer, who brought suit against Sconnie Nation for
producing t-shirts and tank tops displaying an image of the Mayor
of Madison, Wisconsin’s face (as shown below).48 Sconnie Nation
conceded that it had used Kientz’s photograph as the basis of its
work.49
Figure 2:

42

Besides the Second and Seventh circuits, other circuits have not appeared to
take a direct stance in balancing the first and fourth factors. The Ninth Circuit
recently stated “that factor one and factor four have ‘dominated the case law’ and
are generally viewed as the most important factors.” Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc.,
725 F.3d 1170, 1179 (9th Cir. 2013). The Ninth Circuit previously acknowledged
that “[a] transformative work is less likely to have an adverse impact on the market
of the original than a work that merely supersedes the copyrighted work.” Kelly
v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 821 (9th Cir. 2003). The Eleventh Circuit also
did not explicitly determine which factor is more important but recognized the
tension between the first and fourth factor in a case where it found that the fourth
factor weighed strongly against fair use and the first factor weighed only slightly
in favor of fair use. “Therefore, the District Court should have afforded the fourth
fair use factor more significant weight in its overall fair use analysis.” Cambridge
Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1283 (11th Cir. 2014).
43
Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 705 (2d Cir. 2013) (“The first statutory factor
. . . is ‘[t]he heart of the fair use inquiry.’”).
44
Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014) (“We think
it best to stick with the statutory list, of which the most important usually is the
fourth (market effect).”).
45
766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014).
46
714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013).
47
Appropriation art is an art form, seen within pop art, involving “the
intentional borrowing, copying, and alteration of preexisting images and
objects.” Pop Art, MO MA https://www.moma.org/learn/moma_learning/
themes/pop-art/appropriation (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
48
Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 757.
49
Id.
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50

Giving the fourth factor the most importance, the Seventh
Circuit first analyzed the market effect and found that it weighed in
favor of fair use because the clothing did not act as a substitute for
the demand of the original photograph, there was no disruption of a
licensing plan, and the demand for the original work had not been
reduced.51 Also relying heavily on factor three, which analyzes the
amount and substantiality of the original work used, the Seventh
Circuit found that so little of the original copyright remained that
this factor also weighed in favor of fair use.52 Finally, the court gave
little treatment to factors one and two, stating that they “don’t do

50

Picture provided from the court opinion. Id.
Id. at 759.
52
Id.
51

N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 251, 263
Is Fair Use Actually Fair?
much in this case.” 53 Thus, the court held that these actions
constituted fair use and ruled in favor of Sconnie nation.54
Similarly, in Cariou, the Second Circuit dealt with a copyright
infringement suit brought by Cariou, a professional photographer,
against Prince, a well-known appropriation artist, over photographs
in Cariou’s book, Yes Rasta. 55 Prince had created a series of
artworks, under the title Canal Zone, which utilized several torn out
pages of Yes Rasta.56 Prince significantly altered the photographs in
various ways, including painting “lozenges” over their subjects’
facial features and using only portions of some of the images.57
Of the thirty works examined by the court, twenty-five of
Prince’s artworks were found to be transformative under the first
factor because they “have a different character, give Cariou’s
photographs a new expression, and employ new aesthetics with

53

Id. The court stated:
Consider (1), for example. Defendants sold their products in the hope of
profit, and made a small one, but they chose the design as a form of
political commentary. Factor (2) is unilluminating, and as we have
mentioned Kienitz does not argue that defendants’ acts have reduced the
value of this photograph, which he licensed to Soglin at no royalty and
which is posted on a public website for viewing and downloading
without cost.

Id.
54

Id. at 760. The Court ruled in favor of fair use but it seems that they would
have easily ruled the other way had the plaintiffs made a stronger argument for
economic loss. The court stated:
[T]his use may injure Kienitz’s long-range commercial opportunities,
even though it does not reduce the value he derives from this particular
picture. He promises his subjects that the photos will be licensed only
for dignified uses. Fewer people will hire or cooperate with Kienitz if
they think that the high quality of his work will make the photos more
effective when used against them. But Kienitz does not present an
argument along these lines, and the consideration in the preceding
paragraph is not enough to offset the fact that, by the time defendants
were done, almost none of the copyrighted work remained. The district
court thus reached the right conclusion.
Id. at 759–60.
55
Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 699 (2d Cir. 2013).
56
Id.
57
Id.
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creative and communicative results distinct from Cariou’s.”58 Next,
the Court jumped to the fourth factor where it posed a higher burden
for market effect to weigh against fair use. Particularly, the Second
Circuit found that the fourth factor “is not whether the secondary
use suppresses or even destroys the market for the original work or
its potential derivatives, but whether the secondary use usurps the
market of the original work.”59 A secondary use usurps the original
market, encompassing its derivative market, in instances “where the
infringer’s target audience and the nature of the infringing content
is the same as the original.” 60 Because Prince’s work targeted a
different audience than Cariou’s, the fourth factor also weighed in
favor of fair use.61
Next, the Second Circuit found that the second factor weighed
against fair use because the works in dispute were creative, but
nevertheless found that this factor was of “limited usefulness”
because “the creative work of art is being used for a transformative
purpose.” 62 Lastly, in analyzing factor three, Court found that
although “Prince used key portions of certain of Cariou’s
photographs . . . . Prince transformed those [twenty-five]
photographs into something new and different and, as a result, this
factor weighs heavily in Prince’s favor.” 63 This analysis suggests
that if the infringing work is found to be transformative under the
first factor, the first factor overshadows the importance of the
second and third factor. Consequently, the Second Circuit found all
but five artworks to be fair use.64 The remaining five were remanded
to the trial court because “[e]ach of those artworks differs from, but
is still similar in key aesthetic ways, to Cariou’s photographs.”65
Despite the similarities of fact and the same holding, the two
circuits weighed these factors very differently. The Seventh Circuit
directly addressed Cariou, particularly criticizing the Second
58

Id. at 707–08.
Id. at 708.
60
Id. at 709.
61
See id.
62
Id. at 710.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 712.
65
Id. at 711.
59
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Circuit’s application of the test, stating that the Second Circuit failed
to “explain how every ‘transformative use’ can be ‘fair use’ without
extinguishing the author’s rights” to derivative works.66 Although
these cases deal with appropriation art, which is admittedly different
from digitized books, the underlying law is the same. The decisions
did not differ in interpreting whether appropriation is fair use, but
differed in how to balance the factors of fair use, and particularly,
the appropriate way to resolve the tension between the first and
fourth factors. Considering the circuit split, the fair use analysis will
be applied to Authors Guild v. Google in the next section.
B. Fair Use Applied to Authors Guild v. Google
The Supreme Court has not decided a fair use case since the
Campbell decision in 1994.67 Given the Supreme Court’s denial of
certiorari, this case illustrates the need to resolve ongoing conflict in
determining how to weigh the first factor emphasizing the
transformative use against the fourth factor that focuses on market
effects. In theory, these two factors should be two sides of the same
coin because a highly transformative use should not cause market
harm.68 This accounts for why Cariou and Kientz came out the same
way. However, emphasizing different factors can potentially cause
the same facts to yield a different result, as may very well be the
case in Authors Guild v. Google. Because a goal of copyright law is
to ensure the free flow of information to the public, this case was
ultimately determined correctly on the grounds of fair use. Thus, the
correct application of this defense makes it even more important to
realize the shortcomings of fair use and the injustice faced by the
Authors Guild.

66

Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014).
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). Campbell is a case
involving Acuff-Rose Music (Plaintiff) suing members of a rap music group, 2
Live Crew, and their record company for producing the rap song, “Pretty Woman”
that parodied Plaintiff’s rock-ballad “Oh, Pretty Woman.” Although Authors
Guild does not deal with parodies, Campbell is still a valuable reference in
interpreting the application of fair use, as the most recent Supreme Court case on
fair use. Id.
68
Id. at 591.
67
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1. Transformative Use: The Purpose and Character of the Use
The first statutory factor, “the purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes,” 69 is especially important in the
circuit split. The Supreme Court in Campbell determined whether
the use is transformative, considering whether the use “adds
something new, with a further purpose or different character,
altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.”70 In
determining whether the use is transformative, the “commercial or
nonprofit character” of the use is also considered but is not
conclusive. 71 Commercialism is considered to prevent a
presumptively “unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that
belongs to the owner of the copyright.”72
The Second Circuit heavily weighs this first factor because it
“communicates something new and different from the original or
expands its utility, thus serving copyright’s overall objective of
contributing to public knowledge.” 73 Google has argued that it
satisfied transformative use because copying the texts provides the
public with information that was otherwise unavailable. 74 The
Second Circuit ultimately found transformative use because “the
result of a word search is different in purpose, character, expression,
meaning, and message from the page (and the book) from which it
is drawn.”75
Additionally, the Authors Guild asserted that the immense
financial benefits demonstrate commercial use, a consideration used
69

17 U.S.C § 107 (2012).
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
71
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448–49
(1984) (involving fair use in the context of personal use, involving defendants
who manufactured and sold home video tape recorders). In this case, the Supreme
Court stated that if the technology was being used “to make copies for a
commercial or profit-making purpose, such use would presumptively be unfair.”
Id. at 449.
72
Id. at 451.
73
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 208 (2d Cir. 2015), petition for
cert. filed, 84 U.S.L.W. 3357 (U.S. Dec. 31, 2015) (No. 15-849).
74
Id. at 215.
75
Id. at 217.
70
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to weigh against a finding of transformative use. 76 However, the
Second Circuit dismissed this argument because “the more
transformative the secondary work, the less will be the significance
of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a
finding of fair use.” 77 Furthermore, commercial use must not be
given presumptive weight because it would “swallow” uses that are
considered otherwise classic examples of fair use, such as news
reporting, in which selling newspapers for profit does not overcome
the new industry’s ability to claim fair use.78
This first factor is important in the fair use analysis because it
focuses on the public interest. Here, the use is considered
“transformed” because it is now accessible to the public to search in
a new way. This is a broad interpretation of transformation since the
inherent nature and value of the books are not being changed, but
rather, the format is simply being enhanced. However, since the
public benefit from access to more texts is so great, and because
Google has no direct commercial gains from this project, it was
reasonable for the Second Circuit to weigh this factor strongly in
favor of fair use in light of the ultimate goals of copyright law.
2. The Nature of the Copyrighted Work
Although the Second Circuit chose not to weigh this factor
heavily,79 it ultimately would not have affected the outcome in this
case because the majority of the works were nonfictional. This
factor asks whether the work is a creative work, which receives more
protection, or if is more informational and functional in nature,

76

Reply Brief for Plantiffs-Appellants at 5, Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804
F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 12-4829), 2012 WL 5817270.
77
Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 219 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994)).
78
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994). “If,
indeed, commerciality carried presumptive force against a finding of fairness,
the presumption would swallow nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in the
preamble paragraph of § 107, including news reporting, comment, criticism,
teaching, scholarship, and research, since these activities ‘are generally
conducted for profit in this country.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
79

See Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 220.
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which will receive less protection.80 Creative works receive greater
protection because they are the “core” of what copyright law is
designed to protect.81
The court found that the specific works of the three plaintiffs in
this case were factual, non-creative pieces, 82 even though the
plaintiffs hoped to represent all of the authors whose books have
been digitized, which included the “hundreds of thousands, if not
millions, of works of fiction.”83 Nevertheless, plaintiffs argued that
the nonfiction authors may face even greater economic harm
because those “works are often consulted in searches for relatively
narrow types of information that can be found readily by reviewing
small portions of a work without ever accessing the full text.” 84
Because the court gave little weight to this factor, it noted that the
outcome would be the same even if the plaintiffs’ works were
fiction.85
Even if the court gave more weight to this factor, it would not
have helped the Authors Guild win this case. The majority of the
works that Google scanned without permission are nonfictional.
However, the plaintiffs claimed that “hundreds of thousands, if not
millions” 86 of fictional works were infringed as well. However,
factor two and factor one are similar in that the rules appear to be
closely intertwined with allowing uses that most greatly benefit the
public interest. The public should be able to gain access to factual
materials to increase people’s ability to learn and build upon ideas
in such a process that fosters innovation. Although these nonfictional works may have been infringed, the court should not
disregard the factor test as it is traditionally applied. However, in
applying the fair use test, fictional and non-fictional works were
80

ROBERT E. TRAGER, ET AL., THE LAW OF JOURNALISM AND MASS
COMMUNICATION, 606 (Matthew Byrnie et al. eds., 4th ed. 2013).
81
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994).
82
Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 220.
83
Reply Brief for Plantiffs-Appellants at 6–7, Authors Guild v. Google, Inc.,
804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 12-4829), 2014 WL 3795603.
84
Id. at 7.
85
Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 220.
86
Reply Brief for Plantiffs-Appellants at 6, Authors Guild, 804 F.3d 202 (No.
12-4829), 2014 WL 3795603.
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unfairly grouped together and this result poses serious harm to the
creative community. Therefore, this Recent Development argues if
the legislature adopted a compulsory licensing scheme, the law
would be more flexible to accommodate fees arranged based on a
tiered system or an algorithm accounting for the type of work to
correct this injustice.
3. The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used in Relation
to the Copyrighted Work as a Whole
In analyzing the third factor, the statute directs courts to consider
“the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole.”87 If the portion of the text used is
small or unimportant, the court is more likely to decide this
constitutes fair use than if large or vital parts of the text were used.88
Here, the decision came down to numbers. The plaintiffs
asserted that “[u]nder Google’s scheme, a full 78% of any given
work is susceptible to display.”89 However, Google convinced the
court that only 16% is actually revealed when a person conducts a
search. 90 The court reasoned that although 78% is “theoretically
accessible,” it is not in fact accessible because of other restrictions
built into the program. 91 The court also noted that the manner in
which the content is revealed is just as important as the quantity.
Here, the court found that Google’s search reveals content in a
“fragmentary and scattered nature,” but if the search revealed
content coherently, the court’s question and decision would have
changed. Consequently, the court ruled in Google’s favor for this
factor because consumers are unable to experience the true value of
the book through the disjointed and fragmented nature provided
through the snippet function.92
The court noted that, “[e]ven if the search function revealed
100% of the words of the copyrighted book, this would be of little
87

17 U.S.C § 107 (2012).
Authors Guild, 804 F.3d. at 221.
89
Reply Brief for Plantiffs-Appellants at 19, Authors Guild, 804 F.3d 202 (No.
12-4829), 2014 WL 3795603.
90
Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 223.
91
Id. at 222 (emphasis in original).
92
Id. at 223.
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substitutive value if the words were revealed in alphabetical order,
or any order other than the order they follow in the original book.”93
Thus, the court clearly saw more value in order and coherence rather
than the quantity of the work. This further suggests that even if the
court adopted the plaintiffs’ 78% number, the court still would have
weighed this factor in favor of Google on the basis on coherence.
However, this ruling has concerning consequences. If a person
had access to the complete, but scrambled text, that person could
still put words and phrases together like pieces of a puzzle. In this
sense, the third factor is deeply connected the fourth factor. If one is
given enough time to piece the text together, the snippet function
could serve as a market substitute for the original copy of the text.
The Seventh Circuit in Kientz placed great importance on factor
three after discussing factor four, as these two factors are sometimes
inextricably connected. If the Seventh Circuit had decided this
factor, the result likely could have come out the other way.
4. The Effect of the Use Upon the Potential Market for or Value
of the Copyrighted Work
The fourth and final factor of the statute, “the effect of use upon
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work,” 94
considers “not only the extent of market harm caused by the
particular actions of the alleged infringer, but also whether
unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the
defendant would result in a substantially adverse impact on the
potential market for the original.”95 Thus, in the proper application
of fair use, none of the allowed uses would “materially impair the
marketability” of the original work.96 In Sony, the Supreme Court
stressed that it need be only potential harm because it is speculative
that actual proof is possible to obtain, but also that there is a serious
danger in “confining the scope of an author’s rights on the basis of
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Id.
17 U.S.C § 107 (2012).
95
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (internal
citations omitted).
96
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 566–67
(1985).
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the present technology so that, as the years go by, his copyright loses
much of its value because of unforeseen technical advances.”97
In Authors Guild v. Google, the Second Circuit specifically
asked whether the copy serves as “a competing substitute for the
original” which can “deprive the rightsholder of significant revenues
because of the likelihood that potential purchasers may opt to
acquire the copy in preference to the original.”98 The Authors Guild
argued that consumers do not always intend to read books cover-tocover, and, particularly for non-fiction works, just as often consult
books for only a specific piece of information.99 Thus, the “heart”100
of a book should not be found by an objective standard, but rather
subjectively “by the very information sought by the user.” 101
Nonetheless, the court held that Google’s snippet-search function is
not sufficient to serve as a substitute for consumer’s need for the
book that is being searched.102
Despite this holding, the court recognized “that the snippet
function can cause some loss of sales,” but was not convinced that
there was a meaningful or significant effect “upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work.”103 Furthermore, the
court reasoned the snippet function provides a “cumbersome,
disjointed, and incomplete nature” of the book that will rarely satisfy
“searcher’s interest in the protected aspect of the author’s work.”104
However, the plaintiffs asserted, and the court did not address, that
loss should also be viewed on a macro-scale, because there was
strong “competitive landscape and immense commercial value” for
97

Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 482 (1984)
(internal citations omitted).
98
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 208 (2d Cir. 2015), petition for
cert. filed, 84 U.S.L.W. 3357 (U.S. Dec. 31, 2015) (No. 15-849).
99
Reply Brief for Plantiffs-Appellants at 16–17, Authors Guild v. Google, Inc.,
804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 12-4829), 2014 WL 3795603.
100
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 565 (1985). The “heart” of a
text are the text’s “most powerful passages” in all of its chapters, that “carry the
definitive quality of the original,” and “qualitatively embodied . . . [the author’s]
distinctive expression.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
101
Id. at 22.
102
Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 223.
103
Id. at 224 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2012)).
104
Id. at 224–25.
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an online database of copyright-protected books. 105 As a result of
this decision, others who would have potentially licensed and paid
for the right to use a copyrighted work can now proceed to do so
without a license, “forever precluding authors from realizing a new
revenue stream while further entrenching Google’s monopoly.”106
Although this factor may weigh slightly in Google’s favor based on
lack of evidence, the plaintiffs’ argument is fairly compelling.
While the Second Circuit did not address the plaintiffs’ macroscale argument, the Seventh Circuit may have analyzed it and
considered it with great importance. As the Seventh Circuit stated,
“[w]e think it best to stick with the statutory list, of which the most
important usually is the fourth (market effect).”107 Thus, under the
Seventh Circuit precedent, a reviewing court would have taken a
deeper look at the economic effects on the copyrighted authors and
if the court found significant market harm, the court might have held
against fair use. This is especially true if the court viewed the first
factor through the lens of the fourth factor. Since transformative
uses theoretically do not generate considerable market harm, a
finding of such harm would weigh against the notion that the use is
transformative in the first place. Therefore, although the Seventh
Circuit in Kienitz found for fair use, it may have found this argument
persuasive enough to rule in favor of the Authors Guild.
5. Over-Arching Concerns in the Application of Fair Use
Overall, the Second Circuit got it right. In resolving the tension
between the first and fourth factor in this case, the benefit to the
public clearly outweighs countervailing concerns. However, one is
left with a lingering sense of injustice for the Authors Guild. The
writers are forced to take on the economic burden of serving the
public interest, even though they are not necessarily in the best place
to do so. The burden for the public good is placed on “the little guy.”
This, in turn, limits their resources and ability to produce even more
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See Brief for Appellants at 12, Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202
(2d Cir. 2015) No. 12-4829, https://www.authorsguild.org/wp-content/uploads/
2014/10/2014-Jul-24-AGvGoogle-AG-Reply-Brief.pdf.
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Id. at 13.
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Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014).
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creative and scholarly works in the future, which undermines the
ultimate goal of copyright law.108
Some might question the soundness of the four-factor fair use
analysis, which has been deemed the “most trouble-some in the
whole law of copyright”109 because courts seem to apply the doctrine
on a case-by-case basis. 110 Here, the Second Circuit based its
decision on the notion that fair use was designed to serve the public
good, and that Google’s service serves the public good by providing
digitized information that greatly aids research and the flow of
information. However, notable counterarguments include the
significant economic impact on the creative community and the
long-term harm that results from granting Google a “de facto
monopoly.”111
As a result, the court was forced to pick between two evils—
preventing public access to information now or preventing access in
the future. Ruling against the Authors Guild posed a real harm to
many in the writing industry, which may nonetheless harm the
public in the future. Conversely, ruling against Google would have
imposed an immediate harm to the public’s ability to access
information and further society’s pursuit of knowledge. Fair use acts
as an “on/off” switch, which forces one party to be a winner and the
other party to be a loser. However, as fair use is applied to benefit
the public, sometimes the burden on the losing party is simply too
great. Therefore, a different legal avenue ought to be pursued.
108
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 208 (2d Cir. 2015), petition for
cert. filed, 84 U.S.L.W. 3357 (U.S. Dec. 31, 2015) (No. 15-849) (“The ultimate
goal of copyright is to expand public knowledge and understanding, which
copyright seeks to achieve by giving potential creators exclusive control over
copying of their works, thus giving them a financial incentive to create
informative, intellectually enriching works for public consumption . . . . Thus,
while authors are undoubtedly important intended beneficiaries of copyright, the
ultimate, primary intended beneficiary is the public, whose access to knowledge
copyright seeks to advance by providing rewards for authorship.”).
109
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 475 (1984)
(quoting Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939).
110
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
111
Where We Stand, THE AUTHORS GUILD (Last Visited Jan. 29, 2016) (citing
Judge Denny Chin). https://www.authorsguild.org/where-we-stand/authorsguild-v-google/.
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IV. AN ALTERNATE SOLUTION: COMPULSORY LICENSING
Two fundamental concepts underlying copyright law are
incentivizing people to produce creative works112 and promoting the
public’s access to creative works.113 The Authors Guild v. Google
verdict falls short on both accounts. Financial harm to the authors is
clearly asserted by the Authors Guild in the form of lost future
revenues that would have resulted from future licenses. The harm to
the public is more obscure. On the surface, there seems to be a strong
benefit to the public because people can now access a greater wealth
of information online for free. However, this law also helps Google
maintain a monopoly on digitized content, and a lack of competition
between companies can often adversely affect the public. As fair use
provides an imperfect solution, this Recent Development strives to
set forth a more effective solution that does not necessarily harm the
Authors Guild.
One solution existing in intellectual property law, originating in
patent law, but that has also been adopted by copyright law, 114 is
compulsory licensing. A compulsory license, sometimes referred to
as a statutory license, is a remedy that allows access to copyrighted
works or other intellectual property without permission of or against
the wishes of the intellectual property right holder.115 Specifically
pertaining to copyrights, a compulsory license is an unwritten
contract that allows a user immediate access to copyrighted works
without first obtaining permission from the copyright owner. The
user then retroactively pays a fee to the copyright holder.116 In this
scheme, the license must be granted to the class of users if they
“The purpose of copyright is to create incentives for creative effort.” Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450 (1984).
113
The monopoly created by copyright thus rewards the individual author in
order to benefit the public. Id. at 477.
114
Carolos M. Correa, Intellectual Property Rights and the Use of Compulsory
Licenses: Options for Developing Countries, TRADE-RELATED AGENDA,
DEVELOPMENT
AND
EQUITY
WORKING
PAPERS
3
(1999),
http://www.iatp.org/files/Intellectual_Property_Rights_and_the_Use_of_Co.pdf.
115
Jarrod Tudor, Compulsory Licensing in the European Union, 4 GEO. MASON
J. INT’L COM. L. 222 (2013).
116
Yafit Lev-Aretz, The Subtle Incentive Theory of Copyright Licensing, 80
BROOK. L. REV. 1357, 1376 (2015).
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satisfy certain statutory requirements, and depending on the statute,
the price mechanism is set in advance, as determined by Congress.117
The demand for an efficient licensing systems has been “steadily
present in copyright reality” between different creative markets.118
Consumers recognize the indirect harm through the lack of licensing
options that prevents access to various works of authorship that a
licensing system could otherwise allow for, and the resultant
proliferation of piracy.119 Content consumption has many benefits,
allowing consumers to be exposed to greater social, cultural, and
educational concepts as well as encouraging authors to create new
content by drawing inspiration from pre-existing works.
Particularly, compulsory licensing has previously been adopted in
response to the emergence of new technology120 in order to promote
efficiency and transfers, and access to work that would not
otherwise be available under the pre-existing copyright scheme.121
The major benefits of a compulsory license are efficiency and
certainty.122 Compulsory licensing promotes efficiency in two ways:
(1) pre-determined contractual stipulations that eliminate
negotiation costs, and (2) built-in administrative support that
“allows parties to economize on recordkeeping, royalty distribution,
117

Id.
Such demand is present because there is currently a lack of licensing
alternatives available in copyright law and this deficiency has generated a variety
of concerns. Id.
119
See id. at 1373.
120
Id. at 1376.
121
Id. at 1378. “The rise of digital technology rendered existing licensing
models unfit for the mass of creative users wishing to employ copyrighted
materials, and thus, intervening in the market failure through compulsory
licensing mechanisms seems adequate. By removing the difficulties involved in
identifying and locating rightholders, bargaining over licensing fees, and
transferring assets, compulsory licenses lessen transaction costs and allow many
transfers that would not otherwise occur.” Id.
122
Id. at 1376–77. Furthermore, compulsory licensing has the ability to enhance
“speech diversity” because it allows for people to use works in a way they would
other fear constitute infringement. Id. at 1374. In particular, “[w]hen a compulsory
licensing model is prescribed, Congress acknowledges that, for a specific use of
a protected work, the conventional copyright allocation does not appropriately
effectuate copyright social utility objectives.” Id. at 1376.
118
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and payment charging.” 123 The rightsholder will likely benefit
through sales and revenue. Although the rightsholder “might receive
less compensation per use,” the rightsholder could nevertheless be
much better off financially because of the total revenue generated
from an increased number of license transfers. 124 From a policy
perspective, compulsory licenses are desirable because they
communicate the message that a “copyright has its price” 125 and
users are required to pay when accessing work that was generated
by others.
However, there are also legitimate concerns when contemplating
compulsory licenses. While compulsory licensing offers certainty
and efficiency, fair use offers flexibility. There is a concern that
copyright owners may be forced by statute to act against their wishes
in cases where they otherwise would have an exclusive right to
decide how to release their works. 126 Others raise concerns that
compulsory licensing’s “flat rate pricing schemes fail to
differentiate between derivative uses varying in quantitative size and
qualitative importance,”127 that the costs involved in maintaining an
accurate tracking system could also prove expensive, and that if the
tracking system fails, rightholders may end up underpaid.128
Nevertheless, proponents of compulsory licensing find that it is
successful in the intellectual property field,129 and see it as a tool to
mitigate the impact of exclusive rights and thus facilitate the
public’s ability to access information and creative works. 130
Therefore, compulsory licensing can offer many benefits in
digitized books, by allowing the authors the certainty that they will
123

Id. at 1376–77.
Id. at 1378.
125
Id. at 1379.
126
Id. (A salient disadvantage to compulsory licensing is that “the government
expropriates property rights without cause and interferes unduly with market
mechanisms.”).
127
Id. at 1380. “The flat rate associated with compulsory licensing models also
negates rightholders’ ability to participate in price discrimination--a practice that
may augment social welfare by adding to the owner’s income and by allowing
more people to engage in the market of creation.” Id.
128
Id. at 1381.
129
Id. at 1376.
130
See Correa, supra note 115, at 2.
124
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be able to obtain royalties for their work, while still allowing for an
efficient system and means for Google to create a digitized library
to supplement their search engine. Thus, a compulsory license
allows the public to search the copyrighted materials while still
satisfying the basic needs of both parties. This Recent Development
will first examine existing international and American laws, and
then suggest how compulsory licensing can be specifically
implemented in the case of Authors Guild v. Google to reform
copyright law in the field of digitalized books.
A. International Compulsory Licensing and the Berne Convention
International analysis of copyright law and compulsory
licensing is noteworthy because American copyright law does not
exist completely independently from other countries. International
copyright law is connected to other countries through multilateral
agreements like the Berne Convention.131 There are two articles in
which the Berne Convention explicitly allows compulsory
licensing: Broadcasting and Related Right 132 and Possible
Limitation of the Right of Recording of Musical Works and Any
Words Pertaining Thereto. 133 However, the Berne Convention
specifically prohibits Compulsory Licensing for Cinematographic
and Related Rights.134
The Berne Convention refers to compulsory licensing for
Broadcasting and Related Rights in its language: “It shall be a matter
131
JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY
564 (Erwin Chemerinsky et. al. eds. 4th ed. 2015) (citing Dellar v. Samuel
Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939)). The United States is a signatory
to the Berne Convention. The purpose of joining the Berne Convention is “to
ensure protection of its citizens’ creative works outside its own boundaries.” And
thus, “[a]dherence to the Berne Convention will ensure strong, credible U.S.
presence in the global marketplace and is also necessary to ensure effective U.S.
participation in the formulation and management of international copyright
policy.” Id. (quotations omitted).
132
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
opened for signature Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27,
99th Cong. (1986) (revised at Paris, July 24, 1979) art. 11 [hereinafter Berne
Conv.].
133
Id. at art. 13.
134
Id. at art. 14.
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for legislation in the countries of the Union to determine the
conditions,”135 where the term “conditions” references compulsory
licensing. 136 It provides an analogous statement for the Right of
Recording and Musical Works.137 If a nation decides to implement a
compulsory license, this language allows the nation to do so as long
as it follows specific conditions.
When the agreement was last amended in 1979, the drafters
contemplated appropriate language for extant mediums, such as for
broadcasting and musical works. 138 The rules for compulsory
licenses for broadcasting were set forth as many governments
demonstrated an interest in the medium “because of its powerful
informatory, educational and entertainment role.” 139 On the other
hand, the language for musical works was inserted as a “pragmatic
compromise that was already emerging at the national level between
musical copyright owners (mainly publishers) and the newly
emerging recording industry.”140
135
Id. at art. 2. “It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union
to determine the conditions under which the rights mentioned in the preceding
paragraph may be exercised, but these conditions shall apply only in the countries
where they have been prescribed. They shall not in any circumstances be
prejudicial to the moral rights of the author, nor to his right to obtain equitable
remuneration which, in the absence of agreement, shall be fixed by competent
authority.” Id.
136
Sam Ricketson, WIPO Study on Limitations and Exceptions of Copyright
and Related Rights in the Digital Environment, 31 (WIPO) (April 5, 2003)
(hereinafter Ricketson, WIPO Study) (“The reference to ‘conditions’ in Article
11bis(2) is usually taken to refer to the imposition of compulsory licenses, but the
form of these licenses is left to national legislation to determine.”).
137
Berne Conv., supra note 133, art. 13 “Each country of the Union may impose
for itself reservations and conditions on the exclusive right granted to the author
of a musical work and to the author of any words, the recording of which together
with the musical work has already been authorized by the latter, to authorize the
sound recording of that musical work, together with such words, if any; but all
such reservations and conditions shall apply only in the countries which have
imposed them and shall not, in any circumstances, be prejudicial to the rights of
these authors to obtain equitable remuneration which, in the absence of
agreement, shall be fixed by competent authority.” Id.
138
Berne Conv., supra note 133, art. 11, 13.
139
Ricketson, WIPO Study, supra note 137, at 30.
140
Id. at 29.
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The Berne Convention took place long before the development
of the Google Library Project. Although it is impossible to know
precisely what the drafters would think about digitized books, and
the drafters did not discuss licensing of books in the main body of
their text, they did discuss the potential for developing country book
translation licensing in the Appendix of the Berne Convention.141 It
provided that developing countries might choose to implement
licensing systems for “printed or analogous forms of
reproduction.” 142 For developing countries, the Berne Convention
wanted to implement a licensing scheme for written works as it was
“principally concerned with such things as encyclopedias and
anthologies, schoolbooks, manuals on physics, chemistry,
engineering, space-exploration, etc., and not the latest song hit or
the new London or Paris stage success.”143 Thus, although there is
no specific licensing provision for written works as there is with
music and broadcasting, the drafters of the Berne Convention would
have allowed for flexible treatment for applying compulsory
licensing to books. However, the drafters believed that compulsory
licenses should be constructed in a way that was fair and just. 144
Thus, in the spirit of the Berne Convention, it appears that although
compulsory licensing is certainly not the go-to for copyright

141

Berne Conv., supra note 133, Appendix art. 2.
Id.
143
World Intellectual Property Organization, Guide to the Berne Convention
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Publication no. 615(E), WIPO
153 (1978).
144
The language of “equitable remuneration” and determining what would have
been paid if there are no compulsory licenses in place can be seen as the drafters
ensuring that any compulsory licenses adopted by countries should be fair and
just. See Ricketson, WIPO Study, supra note 137 at 30. (“If a country imposes
reservations and conditions under Article 13(1), these must not be ‘prejudicial to
the rights of these authors to obtain equitable remuneration which, in the absence
of agreement, shall be fixed by the competent authority.’ As noted above, this is
normally taken to mean that the conditions and reservations which are imposed
will take the form of compulsory licenses. Its effect is certainly to exclude
provisions which enable the free recording of works, or to permit this for less than
an equitable remuneration . . . the role of the competent authority is crucial, as it
will have to make a notional judgment as to what amount would have been
negotiated in the absence of a compulsory license.”(citing Berne Convention)).
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legislation, it is acceptable to address specific problems that arise if
drafted thoughtfully.
As the Berne Convention is an international agreement, it is not
indicative of country-specific compulsory licensing law. European
courts have applied compulsory copyright licensing laws as seen for
example in the Magill145 case. Decided in the European Court of
Justice, 146 Magill involved local television stations in Ireland that
refused to license their program guides to Magill Company,147 which
sought to publish a comprehensive television guide.148 The stations
asserted their copyright protections, but the European Court of
Justice upheld a compulsory copyright license that forced the
stations to hand over their materials to Magill.149 In the analysis, the
court found that the local television stations had a factual monopoly
over the production and publication of their weekly listings because
the “listings are a by-product of the programme scheduling process,
carried out and known only to the programme planners
themselves.” 150 The court further acknowledged that “the listings
only become marketable products when the schedules themselves
145

Commission Decision 89/205/EEC of 21 December 1988, Case IV/31.851,
Magill TV Guide/ITP, BBC and RTE, 1989 O.J. (L78) 43, 44, http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31989D0205
&qid=1454970750223&from=EN [hereinafter Magill Commission Decision];
see Joined Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann, Indep.
Television Publ’ns Ltd v. Comm’n, 1995 E.C.R. I-743, 4 C.M.L.R. 718 (1995),,
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:
61991CJ0241&from=EN.
146
The European Court of Justice is comprised of one judge from each EU
country and eleven advocates general. Court of Justice of the European Union,
EUROPEAN UNION (last visited Mar. 4, 2016), http://eurpa.eu/abouteu/institutions-bodies/court-justice/index_en.htm.
147
“Magill TV Guide Ltd, Dublin, was established in order to publish in Ireland
and Northern Ireland a weekly magazine containing information on forthcoming
television programmes available to television viewers in the area.” Magill
Commission Decision, supra note 146 at 44.
148
Id. at 44.
149
”Accordingly the only remedy possible in the present case is to require ITP,
BBC and RTE to supply each other and third parties on request and on a nondiscriminatory basis with their individual advance weekly programme listings and
to permit reproduction of those listings by such parties.” Id. at 50.
150
Id. at 48.
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are finalised (subject to last minute changes), a short time before
transmission.”151 It is impossible for third parties to produce reliable
listings without first obtaining the listings from the corresponding
broadcasting organizations or the rights owners of the listing.152 As
a result, third parties are economically dependent on the
broadcasting organizations and rightsholders, who are in the
dominant position. 153 The court reasoned “that an abuse is
committed if an undertaking in a dominant position limits
production or markets to the prejudice of consumers.”154 Here, the
television stations committed abuse by limiting the scope of their
licensing policies, which prevented production and sale of TV
guides, which had an ultimate effect of restricting competition and
prejudicing consumers.155
Through this reasoning, the court mingles copyright and
compulsory licensing with concepts of antitrust and fair
competition.156 In Authors Guild, similar concerns have been raised
that Google may have a de facto monopoly with its search engine’s
ability to provide the snippet-function as a result of the decision.
What can be gleaned from international and European laws is that
copyright law should not be considered in a vacuum and that
compulsory licensing can be an appropriate remedy when there are
antitrust concerns resulting from copyright holder’s right to
exclusive use. In the international sphere, the Berne Convention
permits the use of compulsory licenses and other countries have
embraced the notion to solve certain problems. Compulsory
licensing has worked in other countries and the legal concept is
accepted internationally as a useful remedy for certain copyright
151

Id.
Id.
153
Id.
154
Id. at 49.
155
Id.
156
Antitrust and fair competition largely fall outside the scope of this paper,
however, there are US cases that deal with these issues. See United States v. Glaxo
Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 64 (1973) (“Mandatory selling on specified terms and
compulsory patent licensing at reasonable charges are recognized antitrust
remedies.”); United States v. Besser Mfg. Co., 343 U.S. 444, 447 (1952); United
States v. General Electric Co., 115 F. Supp. 835, 843-46 (D.N.J. 1953).
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issues. Though Magill is certainly not binding on the United States,
it is a helpful illustration and provides a broader perspective when
looking at American compulsory licensing law.
B. American Law: Example of Compulsory Licensing under
Section 115157
Like European law, compulsory licensing is not a foreign
concept in American law. Compulsory licensing in the United States
dates back to the era of phonograph record players when musicians
sold more than sheet music.158 When phonographs were novel, and
thus not paying royalties, Congress amended the statute for
copyright owners to control “mechanical reproduction” of their
works.159 However, Congress was suspicious of the market power of
the Aeolian Company, 160 which produced piano rolls, and thus
enacted a compulsory licensing scheme for the first time.
Codified under 17 U.S.C. § 115 for nondramatic musical works,
making and distributing phonorecords is subject to compulsory
licensing.161 The statute defines phonorecords as “material objects in
which sounds, other than those accompanying a motion picture or
other audiovisual work, are fixed.” 162 Simply put, § 115 allows a
person to distribute a new sound recording of a musical work, if that
has been previously distributed to the public, by or under the
157

See 17 U.S.C. §§ 115, 118, 111(c), 114(d) (2012). Instances where
compulsory licensing included non-dramatic musical compositions, public
broadcasting, retransmission by cable systems, subscription digital audio
transmission, and non-subscription digital audio transmission such as Internet
Radio. Id.
158
COHEN ET AL., supra note 132, at 413.
159
Id.
160
“The Aeolian Corporation was one of the largest and most successful piano
companies in American History. Established in 1903, Aeolian originally built its
empire on the new-found popularity of the player piano. Aeolian went on to be a
leading builder of all types of pianos and organs in America and Europe, and most
of their pianos during this time were of excellent quality.” Aeolian, ANTIQUE
PIANO SHOP (last visited Mar. 4, 2016), http://antiquepianoshop.com/onlinemuseum/aeolian/; Aeolian Halls – A History of Concerts Inspired by the Pianola,
PIANOLA
INSTITUTE
(last
visited
Mar.
4,
2016)
http://www.pianola.org/factsheets/aeolianhalls.cfm.
161
17 U.S.C. § 115 (2012).
162
Id. § 101.
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authority of the copyright owner. 163 Thus, this allows artists to
record “covers” of musical works created by other artists.164 The new
recording need not be identical to the previous work, as the
compulsory license includes the privilege of rearranging the work to
conform it to the recording artist’s interpretation.165 For example, in
recording a cover of a song, the recording artist might chose to make
stylistic alterations or change a word. Congress enacted § 115
because by 1995 it had recognized that “digital transmission of
sound recordings was likely to become a very important outlet for
the performance of recorded music” and that “these new
technologies also may lead to new systems for the electronic
distribution of phonorecords with the authorization of the affected
copyright owners.”166
Furthermore, there remains some flexibility in the law as the
compulsory license not mandatory but allows any creator and
distributor of phonorecords to negotiate directly with the copyright
holder.167 In the event the copyright owner cannot be reached, the
recording artist can use the compulsory licensing provisions. 168
However, if the recording artist does not pay the compulsory license
to the copyright holder, then the recording artist has committed
infringement. Despite these statutory provisions, the compulsory
license is not the means by which creators typically obtain
permission for musical works.169 Instead, it is more common for a
creator to contract for a song through the Harry Fox Agency170 in
163

See id. § 115.
COHEN ET AL., supra note 132, at 413.
165
Compulsory License for Making and Distributing Phonorecords,
COPYRIGHT OFFICE 2, http://copyright.gov/circs/circ73.pdf.
166
Marybeth Peters, Section 115 Compulsory License, COPYRIGHT OFFICE
(Mar. 11, 2004) http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat031104.html.
167
Compulsory License for Making and Distributing Phonorecords, supra note
165.
168
Id.
169
COHEN ET AL., supra note 132, at 414.
170
What does HFA do? HFA (last visited Mar. 4, 2016),
https://www.harryfox.com/publishers/what_does_hfa_do.html. The Harry Fox
Agency (HFA) “is the leading provider of rights management, licensing, and
royalty services for the U.S. music industry and was established in 1927 by the
National Music Publishers’ Association (NMPA) as an agency to license, collect,
164
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New York City through a music publisher or use of Songtrust.171 The
statutory compulsory license does not affect the rates paid by the
recording artist, but it is rare that the agreed license rate would
exceed a rate that would otherwise be set by the Copyright Royalty
Judges.172
As seen through phonorecords, compulsory licensing has
already been successfully adopted in America. The concepts and
structure from this existing scheme provides a foundation that can
be built upon and applied to a different creative medium under
copyright law: electronic books.
V. APPLYING COMPULSORY LICENSES TO BOOKS
In what has been coined as the Google Book Search (“GBS”)
settlement, Google and the Authors Guild independently created a
scheme that resembles compulsory licensing.173 In fact, if the district
court had approved the GBS settlement, it would have been
“tantamount to legislative reform”174 because “Google was planning
to make no effort to get actual consent from class members, who
instead would have been deemed to have consented by virtue of their
membership in a class whose counsel negotiated the settlement,
supposedly on their behalf.” 175 Thus, compulsory licensing is
especially fitting for this medium because it is a solution to which
both parties have already agreed.
and distribute royalties on behalf of musical copyright owners. HFA issues
mechanical licenses for products manufactured and distributed in the U.S. A
mechanical license grants the rights to reproduce and distribute copyrighted
musical compositions (songs) for use on CDs, records, tapes, ringtones,
permanent digital downloads, interactive streams and other digital formats
supporting various business models, including locker-based music services and
bundled music offerings.” Id.
171
COHEN ET AL., supra note 132, at 414 (“Songwriters who have not contracted
with a music publisher may utilize Songtrust, an entity that has arrangement with
Harry Fox as well.”).
172
Id.
173
Pamela Samuelson, The Google Book Settlement As Copyright Reform, 2011
WIS. L. REV. 479, 482–83 (2011) (“It would, in effect, give Google a compulsory
license to commercialize millions of out-of-print books[.]”).
174
Id. at 515.
175
Id.
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The current system of fair use may seem to offer flexibility by
allowing courts to grapple with the fact-specific issues of each case.
However, fair use functions as an “on/off switch.” 176 In fair use
cases, courts can find infringement and hold the defendant liable or
find fair use. If court finds infringement, the third party may not be
able to use the work at all if they are unable to receive consent from
the author. However, if the court finds fair use, the copyright owner
does not receive any compensation. Thus, the fair use system is rigid
because it only allows for binary outcomes. In contrast, compulsory
licensing allows for a middle ground where neither party is severely
disadvantaged and the public retains its ability to access all the
information.
Compulsory licensing can be created separate from the world of
fair use and softens fair use’s hard line by allowing for an
alternative. The compulsory license should be narrowly tailored,
similar to the law concerning producing and distributing
phonorecords that embody a musical work that had been previously
distributed to the public. 177 Thus, instead of not being able to
reproduce an entire pre-existing song, a recording artist is able to
perform that song as long as he pays the appropriate fee. If Congress
were to adopt a similar compulsory license provision for
phonorecords, it could also draft the statute narrowly tailored to
digitized books.
In contemplating how to draft such a provision, the GBS
settlement drafted in October 2008 is a valuable resource. In the
settlement, Google agreed to pay $125 million, $45 million of which
would have gone to the rightsholders of copyrighted works that had
been infringed and $34.5 million would have gone to a newly
created Book Rights Registry, “an organization that would track
down and distribute fees to authors.” 178 Furthermore, Google
specified it would pay 63% “of all revenues earned by Google
through uses of Books in Google Products and Services,” which
176

Jane C. Ginsburg, Fair Use for Free, or Permitted-but-Paid?, 29 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1383, 1383 (2014).
177
See COHEN ET AL., supra note 132, at 413.
178
Where We Stand, THE AUTHORS GUILD (Jan. 29, 2016),
https://www.authorsguild.org/where-we-stand/authors-guild-v-google/.
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would also be distributed by the Registry.179 In turn, Google would
no longer be liable for copyright infringement.180 The settlement also
benefitted the public by including more access to out-of-print books,
additional ways to purchase copyrighted books, institutional
subscriptions to millions of books online, and free access from
American libraries.181
Ultimately, the settlement was not approved in a hearing by
Judge Chin, who ruled in March 2011 that the settlement was not
“fair, reasonable, and adequate” to the class on whose behalf it was
negotiated.182 As the settlement functioned largely as a compulsory
license, it was not suitable for a judge to accept as a settlement. 183
However, this settlement is evidence that a compulsory license is a
legal avenue both parties are willing to accept.
Specifically, this settlement is proof that it is possible to propose
a compulsory licensing scheme that can be beneficial to creators, an
online vendor, and the public. If a compulsory license is to be
adopted, it should not unduly burden either side and thus not harm
either industry. Perhaps most importantly, the compulsory licensing
scheme will ensure that the public will still have easy access to
information that it will have under the current law where Google is
granted fair use.
A compulsory license benefits Google because it provides
efficiency. Under this scheme, there is a presumption that Google
can copy the work without worrying that an author will be difficult
to find or refuse permission. Google would simply have to pay a fee.
This is vital because Google was already investing a great deal of
money in the project by scanning and indexing books and creating
179

Amended Settlement Agreement at 24, The Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google
Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) https://www.authorsguild.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/10/2009-Nov-13-AGvGoogle-Amended-SettlementAgreement.pdf.
180
Id.
181
Press Release, Authors Guild, Joint PUBLIC FAQ 1,
https://www.authorsguild.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/Press-FAQs-10.28.08.pdf.
182
Samuelson, supra note 174, at 482.
183
See Samuelson, supra note 174, at 539 (stating “courts should engage in
heightened scrutiny of the certifiability of a settlement class when the settlement
would, in effect, achieve legislative outcomes”).
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the snippet-feature. The company did not want to undergo the hassle
of “seek[ing] advance permission, on a book-by-book basis, for
every in-copyright book merely to serve snippets.”184 In addition to
being too time-consuming, Google also believed it would “cost too
much to allow an effective market to form.”185 Thus, if Google had
lost the fair use claim, its project may have become impracticable
and it would have had to drop the endeavor all together.
A compulsory license also benefits the authors because it
provides certainty. The authors receive guaranteed revenue, whereas
the current law prohibits an author from obtaining any
compensation. In the current scheme, the authors do not collect any
compensation because Google is able to use their work for free
under fair use. Thus, the compulsory license, at the very least, will
ensure that the authors get some revenue. In drafting the compulsory
license, Congress will need to be sensitive to market forces. There
are different revenue systems that can be adopted. Although a flat
rate is the simplest, it is not preferable because not all books are of
equal value. There are different pricing scheme possibilities such as
a tiered system, in which different categories of books receive
different amounts of compensation, or, as seen in the Google Books
settlement, a special algorithm can be created. As this issue arose
with the advancement of technology, Congress should use likewise
use technological advancements in resolving the problems inherent
in digitized books.
As Google is copying tens of thousands of books, author fees
will quickly accumulate. Google claims it is not making any direct
profit from the Library Project. 186 Imposing the fee will either
require Google to find a way to generate money from this endeavor
or force Google to decide to drop the project entirely. However, if
Google drops the project, the public will have diminished access to
information—a situation that copyright law is designed to avoid.
Google has various options to generate revenue if it has to start
paying the authors. Google can start adding advertisements to the
184

Id. at 562, n. 176.
Id.
186
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 208 (2d Cir. 2015), petition for
cert. filed, 84 U.S.L.W. 3357 (U.S. Dec. 31, 2015) (No. 15-849).
185
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service or start charging people for the services it provides, such as
an annual fee for unlimited access. An alternate method for
generating revenue would be for Google to take its snippet function
a step further by allowing consumers to buy Google’s electronically
scanned books, and, correspondingly, have a compulsory licensing
scheme that adopts a bookstore model by which authors receive
revenue.
A. Taking it one step further - the Bookstore Model
If a compulsory licensing method is adopted, it is necessary to
visualize how it would work practically in the real world. Since
Google is almost acting as a bookstore, the compulsory licensing
scheme can mimic the concept of a bookstore. Google currently
allows customers to browse books but the customers cannot directly
buy these books from Google. This is because Google only has the
right granted by fair use to use the snippet function. The snippet
function is the online equivalent to walking into a bookstore and
reading only parts of a book. This function allows a consumer to get
a general feel of the book, and extract some information out of the
book for free, without the added value intrinsic in book purchase.
If Google’s Library Project functioned like a bookstore,
everyone would benefit. To create the snippet function, Google has
already scanned and created entire digital copies of every book. A
compulsory licensing scheme allows Google to adopt the “highrisk” option that local bookstores use for local authors. Thus, people
can read parts of the book for free, and they can buy the book
directly from Google that are not otherwise available. In turn,
Google will pay a certain percentage of the book, for example the
standard 60%, to the author once the book is purchased by a
consumer. This should not be a difficult system to implement
because Google already has a system where it sells books on Google
Play.187 Combining Google Play with the resources of the Google
187

This paper suggests Google can expand on its pre-existing marketplace to
sell e-books that it has created that have otherwise not been made available. See
Margaret Rouse, Google Play (Android Market), SEARCH MOBILE COMPUTING
(Mar. 4, 2016), http://searchmobilecomputing.techtarget.com/definition/GooglePlay-Android-Market (“Google Play . . . is the official app store for Android
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Library Project should not burden Google. Google will likely adopt
this relatively simple solution rather than risk losing all the capital
it invested in the Library Project. The public will still be able to
access all the online information from books, Google will benefit,
and there will be more royalties paid to the authors.
Furthermore, the settlement suggested that Google was planning
to use the electronic library of books they created for more than the
snippet function. The agreement would allow Google to “display
out-of-print books to users and charge licensing fees for copyrighted
works. Additionally, the settlement required Google to provide
portals in every public library and more than 4,000 colleges and
universities in the U.S., allowing widespread access.”188 Creating a
compulsory licensing scheme that treats this technology as an
electronic bookstore will promote efficiency and allow for the
possibility of these goals to still be fulfilled
This solution is consistent with fair use as Google is still able to
provide snippets of the text. However, this proposal allows for
authors to profit by including a purchasing method. It benefits the
public because kindle and tablet users may have a preference for a
digital copy of the text. Perhaps people may need the text
immediately and cannot wait for it to ship or the book is not at a
nearby bookstore. Certain books, such as orphan works where the
rightsholders are indeterminable, may not be available at all. Thus,
it is almost wasteful to not to allow the use of the Google Library
Project to function as a bookstore where authors can profit. The
ultimate goal in Authors Guild v. Google was to allow for a greater
dissemination of knowledge to the general public. Adopting this
scheme will satisfy this goal of copyright law. Millions of works
will be accessed in a way that was never previously possible, while
allowing for the efficiency and certainty the Google and the Authors
Guild need to successfully continue on in their respective industries.

Smartphones and tablets. Google makes . . . books available for purchase and
download through the store.”).
188
Authors Guild v. Google, THE AUTHORS GUILD (Jan. 29, 2016),
https://www.authorsguild.org/where-we-stand/authors-guild-v-google/.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Authors Guild v. Google encompasses fair use issues but suffers
from the limitations of the doctrine. Although compulsory licensing
may seem to be a rigid and hands-on approach, it is preferable to fair
use that currently functions as an on/off switch and does not
adequately address all issues. Under the confines of fair use, the law
is not able to adequately able to adapt to certain novel technologies,
such as digitized books. Thus, Congress should consider
compulsory licensing, a concept familiar in copyright and
intellectual property law. By adopting compulsory licensing,
Congress can ensure that the public receives greater access to
information online while also ensuring revenue to authors and
efficiency for Google.
With the advancement of technology, copyright law cannot stay
stagnant. The process of selecting and purchasing books is
becoming digitized. If Google and Amazon are to become the next
major bookstores, the law should accommodate authors so that they
can profit as they have in the past.
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